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DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of
the issues herein.

(Set forth in the Addendum).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DEFAULT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE FOR MISTAKE
AND EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
In reading appellee Slingerland's Brief, one would be led to
believe that the judicial system would be brought to its knees if
Baum were allowed to have his day in court.

In claiming that Baum

"did not meet his burden of proof/' Slingerland ignores the plain
language of the court's ruling and basis for denying Baum's Motion
to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment which was that:
All concerned were aware of the proceedings,
or reasonably could have been with proper
attention . . . (R. 0207)
In other words, the court ruled that a Default will not be set
aside if the defaulting party conceptually "could" have taken steps
to prevent it.
Appellant Baum respectfully submits that the court's ruling is
in error in that it applies hindsight to what Baum "could" have
done instead of examining Baum's actions which actually did take
place.

1

In his Motion to Set Aside the Default, Baum informed the
court that due to the totality of circumstances existing at the
time the Default was entered his "inaction" constitutes excusable
neglect.

Baum was faced with the traumatic experience of being

sued by his best friend who is now a quadriplegic.
company had earlier denied coverage.

His insurance

He was young with no

experience in the legal system and he was confused as to the state
of affairs.

Due to conversations with Slingerland's attorney who

advised him he would seek coverage from the insurance company and
a family attorney who advised him that his best option may be
bankruptcy, Baum took no action during the time the Answer was due.
Subsequently, Baum contacted his insurance carrier, informed them
of the fact that a lawsuit had been filed, and defense counsel was
retained for him and a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was
filed.

The court below did not consider these factors in its

decision, but merely ruled that since Baum was or should have been
aware of the proceedings, that the Default would not be set aside.
Baum respectfully submits that such a ruling does not apply the
correct standard of whether or not a Judgment by Default should be
set aside under Rule 60(b) and that the court's ruling is,
therefore, in error and an abuse of discretion.
Further, in his Brief of Appellee, Slingerland ignores the
fact that in his memorandum opposing the Motion to Set Aside
2

Default all arguments were made, not against Baum, but against
USF&G, a non-party.
and

provides

no

In his Brief, Slingerland makes no response
explanation

to

this

court

concerning

the

inappropriateness of such an argument made below and of the
apparently successful "straw man" attack against USF&G.
Baum respectfully submits that the court below further abused
its discretion in failing to set aside the Default Judgment by
relying on Slingerland's attack against USF&G as its basis for
failing to set the Default aside.

(R. 0217).

In responding to

Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, Slingerland never
claimed he would be prejudiced if the Default were set aside,
instead he filed a 13-page Memorandum arguing that "USF&G" had not
met its burden as to why the Default should be set aside, that
"USF&G/s" Motion to Set Aside the Default was untimely and that
"USF&G" has failed to show that Baum had a meritorious defense.
The court below wrongfully based its decision to deny Baum's Motion
to Set Aside the Default on Slingerland#s arguments against USF&G.
In summary, a Default Judgment was entered against Baum due to
Baum's inexperience, emotional state, confusion, and circumstances
which constitute mistake and excusable neglect.

There was no

evidence of prejudice should the Default be set aside.

The court

below refused to set the Default aside based on Slingerland#s
arguments against "USF&G" and due to the fact that Baum "could"
3

have conceivably taken some action to prevent the Default which, of
course, could be said on a theoretical basis of all Judgments by
Default. As such, Baum respectfully submits that the court abused
its discretion in failing to set the Default aside.
POINT II
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY
The Default Judgment in favor of Slingerland and against Baum
was entered on June 17, 1992. The Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment was filed on September 11, 1992, within the required three
months of Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In opposing

Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default in the court below,
Slingerland claimed that the Motion to Set Aside was untimely
because

it was

filed

more

than

90 days

after

the

Default

"Certificate" was entered, which took place on May 18, 1992.
However, Rule 60(b) refers to a "Judgment" and not a Default
Certificate as the relevant time from which to measure the three
months during which a Motion to Set Aside may be filed.
For Slingerland to now, for the first time on appeal, argue
that the Motion to Set Aside the Default was not filed within a
"reasonable time," is not properly before the court and has no
basis for fact or law.

4

Finally, the court below refused to set the Default Judgment
aside, not for any reason of "timeliness," but for reasons as
outlined in Point I above.
POINT III
BAUM HAS MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
In Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984), the Supreme
stated:
Usually it is not appropriate on Rule 60(b)
motions to examine the merits of the claim
decided by the default judgment. Robinson v.
Myers r Utah 599 P.2d 513 (1979), Board of
Education v. Cox. 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806
(1963).
Although the merits may not be at issue in a Motion to Set
Aside a Default, Baum has a meritorious defense which he should be
able to assert contrary to Slingerland/s assertions that the
accident was solely the fault of Baum.
Section 78-27-40 Utah Code Annotated states in relevant part:
• • • The maximum amount for which a defendant
may be liable to any person seeking recovery
is that percentage or proportion of damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. . . .
Slingerland's

damages

may

be

barred

or

reduced

by

a

substantial degree, should a jury find that his injuries were
caused by his own negligence or other fault. Baum and Slingerland
were involved in a joint venture.
5

Both agreed that Baum should

drive, although both were tired and sleepy and had been awake a
substantial period of time. Slingerland did nothing to assist Baum
in staying awake. Instead, Slingerland took off his seat belt and
went to sleep. As he subsequently woke up, Slingerland exacerbated
the dangerous situation when he yelled at Baum, seeing Baum had
fallen asleep, apparently startling Baum, resulting in the overcorrecting and eventual rollover of the vehicle in which they were
traveling. This accident and Slingerland's injuries did not occur
solely due the fault of Baum.

If Baum's actions rise to the level

of actionable negligence, then so do Slingerland's.
Baum should be given an opportunity to present his defense and
have his day in court.
POINT IV
SLINGERLAND WILL NOT BE PREJUDICED
IF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE
In Westinahouse Electric Supply Company v. Larsen Contractor.
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), the court clearly stated:
. . . Courts generally tend to favor granting
relief from default judgment where there is
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the
adverse party.
Substantial prejudice or injustice to Slingerland must be
shown to be a basis for denial of a Motion to Set Aside the
Default.

No such showing was made.
6

The court below at no time

considered the issue of prejudice or stated as a basis for refusing
to set the Default aside that Slingerland would be substantially
prejudiced.

Most important, Slingerland at no time claimed he

would be prejudiced. Slingerland now claims, for the first time on
appeal, that should the Judgment be set aside, he would be
prejudiced.

To make this argument and present this claim for the

first time on appeal
disregarded.

is improper

and

should, therefore, be

Espinal v. Salt Lake City Board of Education. 797

P.2d 412, 413; Olsen v. Par-Craia-Olsen. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1358;
and Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036,
1039.
Further, Slingerland, in his Appellee Brief, claims that the
issue of prejudice did not arise because the court never found a
prima facie case entitling Baum to relief from Judgment.
argument

is also without merit.

This

The issue of prejudice to

Slingerland did not come up because Slingerland did not claim
prejudice.

According to Slingerland'& reasoning, if the court

below had set the Default aside, Slingerland would then have filed
a new and separate motion and memorandum claiming prejudice, thus
having a second bite at the apple.
The fact remains that in his memorandum opposing Baum's Motion
to Set Aside the Default Judgment, Slingerland failed at any time
to mention or claim prejudice should the Default be set aside.
7

Instead, Slingerland proceeded with various attacks against USF&G,
upon which the court based its decision.
Slingerland did not make a claim of prejudice to the court
below, nor was there any showing or consideration of prejudice at
the time the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was heard.
It is improper to make a claim of prejudice for the first time now
on appeal, and such a claim should be disregarded.
Failing to set aside a Default Judgment where there is no
showing

of

prejudice

under

circumstances

as

exist

herein,

constitutes an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Baum respectfully requests this court to find that
the court below abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the
Default Judgment entered against him based on the following:
1.

Baum was in a state of emotional distress and confused
state of mind at the time the Default was entered against
him.

As a result of conversations with his family

attorney and with Slingerland's attorney, due to the fact
that his insurance company refused to provide coverage
and due to the fact that he was being sued by his best
friend, who was now a quadriplegic, Baum felt, for a time
during which his Answer was due, that there was nothing
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he could do. This was an honest mistake and constitutes
excusable neglect as contemplated under Rule 60(b).
2.

Slingerland did not claim or show prejudice should the
Default be set aside.

3.

The court's basis for refusing to set the Default aside
was that Baum was aware or should have been aware of the
proceedings in question.

(R. 0207). By such a standard,

no Default would ever be set aside, since in hindsight it
can always be stated that the defaulted party could have
done something.
4.

The court further improperly based its decision on the
Memorandum of Authorities filed by Slingerland, which
Memorandum

exclusively attacked USF&G and not Baum.

Slingerland#s

"straw man" attack

against

USF&G

was

improper and the court's denying Baum's Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment based on arguments against
USF&G was an abuse of discretion.
5.

Slingerland's damages did not occur solely due to the
negligence or other fault of Baum.

Slingerland may be

equally at fault or, in the alternative, his damages
should be reduced by his proportionate share of fault.
Accordingly, appellant Baum respectfully submits that this
court find that the court below abused its discretion in refusing
9

to set aside the Default Judgment entered against Baum on June 17,
1992.
DATED this

&T* day of May, 1993.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

Heinzyzl. Mjahler
Attorneyfpr Defendant/Appellant
Douglas M. Baum
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)fraud(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.

